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This study examines the viability of two theories - constructivist theory (where norms 
interact with preferences to shape policy outcomes) and rational choice theory (where actors 
make decisions to further their self-interest) – as a means to explain the European Union’s  (EU) 
implementation of international diamond regulation. The regulation in place, the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), is a multilevel governance initiative designed to stem the 
flow of conflict diamonds. For decades, the illicit diamond trade has spawned human rights 
atrocities in countries where diamonds are procured, impacting the development of several 
diamond-producing nations. Seeing as over 80 percent of international diamond transactions 
occur within the EU’s borders, this governing authority has a large stake in international 
diamond industry regulation.  
In recent years, EU scholars have explored the fruitfulness of constructivism in 
explaining EU policy implementation, in part because it accounts for the way in which the EU 
exerts its authority in our globalized world. That is, scholars have analyzed how the EU exerts its 
authority through values, norms and principles (i.e. upholding human rights abroad), as opposed 
to more traditional forms of power such as military force. My hypothesis states that diamond 
regulation implementation is a case for constructivist theory, as it best accounts for the 
underlying forces behind this highly complex and global supply chain. However, the findings in 
this study indicate that the theoretical explanations behind the EU’s KPCS implementation are 
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just as multifaceted as the diamond industry itself.  
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
The European Union has a distinct identity in the world. No other governing authority 
can tout such a hybrid system of governance composed of a supranational Commission, 
Parliament, Council, Court and individual member states, all interacting to influence vast policy 
outcomes. This dynamic and complex system creates an integrated institution characterized by 
political, economic and social prerogatives that influence the world unlike any other governing 
structure. Since the Treaty of Rome in 1957, when the first customs union was established 
among European nation-states, the EU has proven a constantly changing institution, impacting 
the world in an ambiguous yet meaningful way.  
The way in which the EU influences world affairs is often conceptualized as a function of 
its collective identity (Bretherton et al., 2005). This collective identity has been thought as one 
that is constructed around a set of core values, norms and principles, materializing in what has 
been termed, ‘normative power’ (Lucarelli and Manners, 2006). While the concept of normative 
power has extensive historical roots in colonization (and decolonization), many scholars use this 
paradigm to draw insights on the EU’s global authority today.  
The way in which the EU derives this normative power has fostered extensive dialogue 
around two theoretical models for analyzing the properties of normative influence in 
international affairs. This has manifested in a theoretical yet policy-oriented debate around 
constructivism, which refers to how endogenous preference formation among actors influence 
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policy outcomes, a well as rational choice models of governance, otherwise known as the 
methodological individualist incentives around which actors make choices. While these 
conceptual frameworks have been tested in a variety of EU contexts (Rosamond, 2001; Fierke 
and Wiener, 2001; Moravcsik, 2001) I employ these different theories in my analysis to gain 
clarity on the elements that inform international diamond regulation implementation in the EU. 
 The global regulation framework in place – known as the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme (KPCS) – was introduced in 2003 with the mindset that implementation is 
ongoing (hence, a process). As a fairly recent development, the KPCS is a particular brand of 
international regulation that is unprecedented. That is, in no other market has a regulation 
engaged constituencies around the world in such a short period of time, across governments, 
nongovernmental organizations and industry representatives. As host to some of the world’s 
largest diamond suppliers, including De Beers, the way in which the EU chooses to implement 
diamond regulatory policy holds implications for actors at every stage of this globalized supply 
chain. Additionally, seeing as roughly 80 percent of diamond transactions occur in Belgium 
alone, with the vast majority of worldwide rough diamonds being handled in Antwerp and 
London, the importance of the diamond trade to Europe should not be underestimated.1 Through 
this research, I hope make clear how existing theories in political science help illuminate EU 
diamond regulatory policy. 
 To this end, the following question will be explored: What theoretical model explains the 
implementation process of diamond industry regulation in the European Union? I hypothesize 
that: the implementation of diamond regulation in the EU will illustrate a constructivist 
                                                
1 This is according to a pamphlet released by the European Commission prior to its 
Chairmanship of the Kimberley Process in 2007 (http://www.europa-eu-
un.org/documents/en/070125_EU.pdf)  
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approach to policy-making as opposed to rational choice theory.  Upon gaining clarity on which 
facets most influence implementation at the EU level, it will be possible to gauge the 
implications diamond regulation holds for the EU as well as the global political economy. 
 To provide the most comprehensive analysis of this question, this study will first explore 
the background of diamond regulation, understanding why this market is regulated the way it is. 
Second, a survey of how diamond regulation (in this case, the KPCS) has been implemented in 
the EU will be helpful for understanding the behavior of decision makers when it comes to 
regulating Europe’s diamond market. Third, the theories of rational choice and constructivism 
will be explained in the context of diamond regulation. With a firm grasp of these frameworks, it 
will be possible to move forward in analyzing the ways in which diamond regulation was 
implemented in the EU, and what this means for the viability of constructivism and rationalism 
as theories that account for this global regulatory system.  
 4 
2.0  THE PATH TO DIAMOND REGULATION 
Why is the market for diamonds ‘regulated’? Like many extractive industries, the diamond trade 
has proven a highly lucrative business – each year, the industry produces over $62 billion in 
diamond revenue. Also like many extractive industries, the majority of diamonds are produced in 
African nations and in total, roughly 65 percent of world diamond production occurs on the 
African continent, amounting to roughly $8.4 billion – about one-fifth of total diamond revenues 
worldwide (www.diamondfacts.org, “Diamond Facts.”). Top producing African countries today 
include Botswana (26 percent), South Africa (11.8 percent), Angola (8.1 percent) and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (8.0 percent) (www.economist.com, 2007).  
 However, these countries’ markets and others, notably Sierra Leone, Liberia and more 
recently, Zimbabwe, have endured considerable challenges in recent times. That is, throughout 
the 1990s diamonds fueled instability in African countries already rife with political unrest, 
corruption and violence. This was the case in Sierra Leone, where diamonds were a viable source 
of funding for many rebel groups willing to exploit human rights in order to seize the established 
government. By the end of the 1990s, and after an 11-year civil war, 50,000 people were killed 
across Sierra Leone and hundreds of thousands were displaced (www.un.org, “Conflict 
Diamonds: Sactions and War”). The most prolific rebel group, known as the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) of Sierra Leone, earned roughly $400 million in conflict diamond revenues 
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in over the course of one decade, which were used systematically exploit citizens for arms, labor 
and other abusive means (www.ec.europa.eu, “Blood Diamonds: the international response”).  
 UNITA (Portuguese for, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), an 
Angolan rebel group that gained power as a Cold War proxy militia for the U.S., earned an 
estimated $3 – 4 million from the trade in illegal diamonds in 1999 alone. Sierra Leone and 
Angola were just two African nations that experienced such damaging returns from its diamond 
market. Over the course of the 1990s (and into the 2000s) approximately 3.7 million people were 
killed and another 6.5 million people were displaced across Africa as a result of conflicts fueled 
by diamond profits (www.amnesty.org, “Blood Diamonds are Still a Reality”). Angola was in 
fact the first African nation to attract the attention of the United Nations Security Council, as it 
launched an investigation in 1999 into the activities of UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi, finding 
that he and his supporters were able to leverage illicit diamond profits for munitions purposes 
and war operations. Such activities had been carried out despite continued UN arms and financial 
sanctions (www.un.org, Fleshman), and in April 2000 the Security Council adopted resolution 
1295, establishing a “’Monitoring Mechanism’ to collect additional information and investigate 
any relevant leads regarding sanctions violations, with a view to enhancing the implementation 
of the measures imposed on UNITA” (www.un.org, Fleshman).  
 In response to these events, civil society groups around the world were quick to raise 
awareness of the human rights abuses stemming from diamond transactions. Non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) such as London-based Global Witness and Partnership Africa-Canada, 
aroused public awareness for the linkages between diamonds and conflicts taking place in 
diamond-producing nations. Simultaneously, many consumer groups mobilized around the issue 
of conflict diamonds, urging consumers to boycott the diamond market until the industry 
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committed itself to socially responsible supply-chain operations. This concerted international 
movement was seen as a real threat to the diamond business (an industry that heavily relies on 
the integrity of its brand value) and representatives worldwide therefore saw it in their interest to 
respond to the humanitarian consequences of the global diamond trade (www.economist.com, 
2004).  
 In 2000, representatives of diamond bourses and firms from the World Federation of 
Diamond Bourses (WFDB) and the International Diamond Manufacturers Association (IDMA) 
joined efforts and formed the World Diamond Council, the body that now manages “an industry-
designed system of warranties and chain-of-custody practices that [assures] buyers that the rough 
diamonds they purchased would not come from conflict zones” (Haufler, 2007). By 2001 the 
diamond industry began to implement this voluntary system of internal controls based on a 
tracking system of certificates. However, it soon became apparent that neither states nor industry 
could afford to work in isolation from one another.  
 Thus, in May of 2000, the first discussions took place in Kimberley, South Africa to 
devise a diamond tracking system that would ensure that diamonds would not finance conflict or 
human rights abuses of any nature. By December, 2000, the UN General Assembly passed an 
initiative to regulate the systemic effects of the diamond trade by adopting resolution 
A/RES/55/56 titled, The role of diamonds in fueling conflict: breaking the link between the illicit 
transaction of rough diamonds and armed conflict as a contribution to prevention and settlement 
of conflicts.
2  The term “conflict diamonds” gained traction in popular discourse and become 
defined as, “diamonds that originate from areas controlled by forces or factions opposed to 
legitimate and internationally recognized governments, and are used to fund military action in 
                                                
2 To view document, vist: http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/mms-smm/busi-indu/kpd-pdk/un-resol-eng.pdf 
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opposition to those governments, or in contravention of the decisions of the Security Council.”3 
With this resolution, the UN called upon member states to take substantive measures to trade in 
only ‘legitimate’ diamonds, or only diamonds that came from participant member state 
governments. The Kimberley Process was established the first meeting between major diamond 
producing states, diamond consuming states, industry representatives (including the WDC), and 
civil society organizations.  
 Today, the KP is comprised of 75 member states worldwide who account for 
approximately 99.8 percent of rough diamond production. The European Community4 is 
considered one participant in the KP and represents all 27 of its member states in every plenary 
and inter sessional meetings held in different member state countries.5 As there is no physical 
institution created for the KP, the regulation scheme is run on the basis of annual plenary 
sessions. These plenary sessions are overseen by a Chair that rotates among participants every 
year. The Chair for the following year is selected at the annual plenary session, at which time 
participating countries, industry representatives and civil society groups come together to discuss 
the ongoing process of implementation and current issues. ‘Inter sessional’ meetings take place 
throughout the year and are used to discuss specific working group activities. There are seven 
working groups in total: Monitoring, Statistics, Diamond Experts, Artisanal and Alluvial, 
Participation Committee, Rules and Procedures and a Selection Committee. Each working group 
                                                
3 For further reference, see: http://www.un.org/peace/africa/Diamond.html 
4 Before the European Union was formally established with the Maastricht Treaty of 1993, 
member state were referred to as the European Community, and this term is still used today to 
denote the Single Market among member states. See: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/economic_and_monetary_affairs/institutional_and_econo
mic_framework/treaties_maastricht_en.htm  
5 The EU also accounts for all territories as described in the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, including French overseas departments such as French Guyana.  
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is chaired by a member-state participant, which manages a sub-group of participants to carry out 
the group’s work. For example, the Working Group on Monitoring is chaired by the EU, and 
oversees the work of twelve members in total.  
 The KP can best be characterized as a “global voluntary regulatory system,” and was 
designed around an incentive-based scheme so that no participant could trade with states or 
diamond organizations trading diamonds outside of the process (the logic was that this would 
raise the costs for anyone trading outside of the “club”). This process leverages a certification 
scheme that “provides incentives for participation by providing a ready market for legitimate 
diamond sales – a market that would not be subject to official sanctions or consumer boycotts” 
(Haufler, 2007). The comprehensive system of diamond exchange between countries is now 
known as the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS).  
 This import-export system “applies only to international trade between participants” 
(Weyzig, 2004). However, once a diamond shipment reaches a private organization after being 
inspected by government-appointed customs officials, diamonds are monitored through the 
industry-established System of Warranties. This system operates in the following way: 
 Each warranty issued must be supported by proof that the diamonds were obtained from 
legitimate sources, which means all warranties must match up with warranties received for 
purchases, KP certificates or (in the case of mining companies) proof that diamonds were mined 
from legitimate sources (Weyzig, 2004).  
 In other words, the System of Warranties can be seen as a complement to the 
intergovernmental KPCS, and is a necessary element of any regulation that intends to capture 
negative societal effects of diamond trading. These two systems are considered complementary 
because the KP certificate is used to evaluate the same shipment as it moves through the hands of 
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diamond organizations within country borders (the System of Warranties). Each certificate 
includes information such as the parcel’s country of origin, date of shipment, carat weight and 
value (See Figure 1). Additionally, invoices must accompany diamond shipments from business 
to business, including a ‘written guarantee’ that diamonds are conflict-free.6 Although the 
System of Warranties is obligatory for all organizations operating within KP member-states, the 
rules and regulations for this system, the implementation, is left to the participant countries’ 
discretion – the EU is said to have the strictest implementation guidelines of all KP participants 
(Weyzig, 2004).  
                                                
6 For more details on the tracking system, see: 
http://www.debeersgroup.com/en/Sustainability/Ethics/Conflict-diamonds/ 
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3.0  IMPLEMENTING THE KPCS IN THE EU 
 
Two pieces of legislation that provide a legal basis for implementation of the KPCS in 
the EU include the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986, as well as the Treaty of the European 
Union (TEU) of 1992 (Georges, 16; 1996). The SEA enables diamonds to flow freely between 
EU member states, while the TEU makes it so that the “European Community is considered as 
one entity without internal borders.”7 Diamond bourses, firms and individual traders are 
therefore impacted by how the EU continues to implement the KPCS within the Schengen Area. 
3.1 COUNCIL REGULATION 2368/2002 
 
 In light of the aforementioned resolution passed by the UN General Assembly in 2000, 
the Commission proposed to the Council of Ministers in 2002 a regulation to implement the 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. When the KPCS came into force on January 1, 2003, 
all 49 KP participants (75 countries altogether) were charged with rolling-out a system that 
would best suit their respective trading infrastructure and government institutions already in 
place. Therefore, the Commission, Council and Parliament had to agree on a customs authority 
                                                
7 http://eeas.europa.eu/blood_diamonds/docs/trading_guidelines0108_en.pdf  
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that would serve as both the point of entry/exit for diamonds flowing across the Schengen 
borders. For example, in the United States, these provisions are granted to its Customs and 
Border Protection, an agency within the Department for Homeland Security. In India, on the 
other hand, the Scheme is carried out by the Department of Commerce, which is situated in 
India’s Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Seeing as the EU represents 27 countries, the 
implementation of the KPCS took on a much different, albeit more complex, design for the 
Community in comparison to other participants. Not only was implementation more complex in 
structural terms, but substantively speaking as well. That is, the EU obligates all diamond 
organizations operating within the Schengen Area to strictly follow guidelines set out by (1) 
Community Authorities and (2) the System of Warranties.  
The Community Authorities are diamond bourses that are managed by its member state’s 
external affairs ministry, and are agreed to by the Commission. The Community Authority is in 
place for “namely the verification of incoming shipments for conformity with KP rules and the 
issuance of KP Certificates for export shipments” (Council Regulation 2368/2002). Since 2003, 
the EU has developed six Community Authorities within the Schengen Area - Belgium, the UK, 
Germany, Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Romania – where diamond containers and certificates 
are verified and inspected by authorized customs officials. These authorities (typically co-opted 
by member state foreign ministries) are responsible for ensuring that valid certificates are 
presented with every shipment of diamonds along with reporting trade statistics to the EU, which 
are then aggregated and reported to the KP. In the event that a diamond shipment is not sent from 
or destined for a member state with a Community Authority, “the importer can chose which 
Community authority it will submit the shipment and certificate to, for verification.”  
The second overarching component of the EU’s implementation of the KP, the System of 
 12 
Warranties, is applied to all individuals and organizations engaged in diamond trading among the 
27 member states. While this system is a framework for all industry stakeholders worldwide, the 
European Union has adopted the System of Warranties as a further measure to arrest all illicit 
diamond trading within the Shengen Area. Council Regulation 2368/2002 officially states: 
 
The European Community explicitly endorses the principle of industry  
self-regulation as laid down in Section IV of the KPCS Document in its  
legislation implementing the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme in the  
Community 
 
Chapter IV (“Industry Self-Regulation”) of Council Regulation (EC) No  
2368/2002 sets out requirements for the establishment of a system of  
warranties and industry self-regulation by organisations representing traders  
in rough diamonds 
 
It is important to note that by ‘endorsing’ industry self-regulation, the EU is not 
delegating ‘governmental responsibilities’ to diamond industry stakeholders, but rather, granting 
privileges “to companies subject to considerable responsibilities as members of industry 
bodies.”8 That is to say, the system of warranties in this section of the Regulation is recognized 
as a voluntary process rather than a binding one. However, Article 17 of the Regulation takes on 
a stricter interpretation of the system of warranties, and it has been noted that the EU’s specific 
implementation of the system is the strictest out of all KPCS participants (due to the Council’s 
legal framework) (Weyzig, 2004). For example, one of the criteria that the Council lays out 
                                                
8 This statement can be found online on the EU’s External Action website: 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/blood_diamonds/docs/trading_guidelines0108_en.pdf  
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states that all diamond organizations trading in rough diamonds must: 
 
sell only diamonds purchased from legitimate sources in compliance with the provisions 
of relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions and of the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme and guarantee in writing on the invoice accompanying each sale of 
rough diamonds that, on the basis of their personal knowledge and/or written warranties 
provided by the supplier of such rough diamonds, the rough diamonds sold are therefore not 
conflict diamonds; 
 
3.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF COUNCIL REGULATION 2368/2002  
While in principle the System of Warranties is voluntary at the international level (the 
KPCS forum), under Council Regulation it becomes obligation for all who wish to engage in the 
diamond trade with and among EU member states. Before the KPCS, rough diamonds could be 
imported directly into the Schengen Area even though not all member states had the resources or 
capability for meaningful inspection. Hence, the Community Authority coupled with the System 
of Warranties carries particular weight for diamond industry interests within the EU, as diamond 
traders have since become obliged to tune all operations to this newly developed regime. 
Statistical reporting, for example, has stirred a great deal of commotion among industry 
stakeholders, as valuation of carat weight became standardized for all KP participants and has 
subsequently incurred costs amongst diamond importers and exporters alike. However, before 
analyzing EU-industry relations in full, it is important to lay the theoretical foundation that 
contextualizes diamond regulatory implementation in the EU. Doing so will allow for 
substantive analysis of KPCS implementation in the EU and the extent to which these theories 
hold true in today’s global economy. 
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4.0  CONSTRUCTIVISM AND RATIONAL CHOICE THEORIES 
What are the theoretical explanations for diamond regulation implementation in the EU? By 
drawing from past theoretical frameworks and interpretations, I am hopeful that a better 
understanding of diamond regulatory processes will speak more broadly about how industry 
preferences impact EU policy implementation. Examining this question will elucidate existing 
theories that address international policy implementation at the EU level. As stated in my 
original hypothesis, I suspect that constructivism explains this multilayered approach to diamond 
regulation within the Schengen Area. However, important considerations must be made for how 
rational choice may account for diamond regulation as applied to EU member states. The extent 
to which these theories apply to diamond regulation will then be compared to findings from a 
shadow case study probing the theoretical explanations for KPCS implementation in the U.S. 
Constructing this conceptual bridge will cast light on the implications for KPCS implementation.  
 The case study of the diamond industry in the EU is employed to illustrate the extent to 
which constructivism accounts for policy implementation, seen as a product of endogenous 
preference formation among diamond stakeholders. Within the context of the broader 
constructivist-rationalist dialogue, it will be possible to analyze how pre-existing relations with 
European diamond firms (specifically, De Beers) played a role in this particular brand of 
regulatory implementation. This section will illuminate the literature that analyzes 
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constructivism and rational choice, so as to draw broader insights from diamond regulation 
implementation in the EU. 
 In an effort to establish a logical starting point for analysis, this study will be situated 
in the theoretical paradigm of the constructivist-rationalist dialogue. As noted, this framework 
will provide the appropriate theoretical tools to understand how diamond industry interests bear 
on the implementation of EU diamond regulation – the KPCS. My hypothesis posits that 
constructivism more accurately explains the dynamics of diamond regulation implementation in 
the EU as opposed to rationalism, and this is based on existing conceptualizations of 
constructivism and rationalism in international relations and in EU politics.  
4.1 OVERVIEW OF THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
The constructivist-rationalist debate is often fraught with tension, as rationalists doubt the 
empirical fruitfulness of constructivist tests, and constructivists criticize the disillusionment of 
rationalists as they sidestep political realities. When analyzing the viability of these two theories 
in the context of EU diamond industry regulation, it is logical to evaluate the elements that make 
constructivism substantively different from theories of rationalism. However, it is just as 
important (if not more so) to establish the theoretical overlap between the two when evaluating 
the EU’s implementation of the KP. Seeing as rational theories have traditionally pervaded much 
of the political science literature to date, it is helpful to use this theory as a reference point for 
subsequent evaluation of constructivist methods.  
The contribution of both constructivism and rational choice theory to EU politics (and to 
international relations) is that they circumvent the underlying forces of actors’ interactions. 
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Conceptualizing the reasons for actors’ behavior is valuable for understanding variation among 
states and the stakeholders within them. The point of departure for constructivists and rationalists 
is not the mere existence of certain motivations for action – such as norms, ideas, values, 
interests or relative power – but the role that each force has to play in the decision making 
process. For example, the conceptualization of norms is often a contested feature between the 
two paradigms. While rationalists (particularly, adherents to rational choice theory) 
conceptualize interests and identities as exogenous constraints on actors’ inter-state behavior, 
constructivist theory treats these elements as endogenous to actors’ pursuits of policy outcomes, 
allowing for “a new understanding of interests” among actors as they learn of one another’s 
preferences. As emphasized by constructivist scholars, norms are more complex than simple 
constraints on agents’ actions. From this standpoint, norms are conceptualized as, “shared, 
collective understandings that make behavioral claims on actors” yet for rationalists, norms are a 
product of instrumental reasoning which occurs on the domestic level (Checkel; 2001, 56), 
4.2 RATIONAL CHOICE EXPLAINED 
Rationalist methods, as proposed by Chong (2000) Pollack (2006) and Katzenstein et al. 
(1998), are seemingly wide-ranging and often change based upon the context in which they are 
employed. However, Chong provides a succinct understanding of rational choice by leveraging 
various levels of analysis that apply to the context of political science. According to Chong: 
Individuals act rationally when they choose the best available means to achieve what they 
understand to be in their interest…most examples of rational choice reasoning rely on importing 
assumptions about a person’s goals and his knowledge and beliefs about the world…When we 
say that an option or policy is in someone’s interest, we mean that pursuit of that policy will 
increase the likelihood that he will get something he wants for himself – whether that something 
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is money, or power, or status…If someone does something in order to obtain goods for others, 
then he is acting in their interest and not his own” (12). 
 
Rational choice demonstrates a point of departure from constructivism, adding to the 
dichotomy between diamond industry interests and EU regulation. According to this framework, 
state actors – in this case, the European Community – should  be expressing buy-in to regulation 
only if it is a mean ‘to achieve what they understand to be in their interest.’ This is imperative for 
understanding any empirical analysis that attempts to gauge how and why the KPCS was 
implemented the way it was in the EU. According to this model, the European Commission 
should ‘buy-into’ regulation – such as the self-regulatory provisions in Council Regulation 
2368/2002  - when (1) manipulated persuasion drives decision making (2) Normative ideas are at 
play when they align with broader policy incentives (3) Strategic incentives are primary for 
policy outcomes with ideas as ‘transmission belts.’ (Checkel et al; 2001).  
Mark Pollack (2006) lodges rational choice theory within EU integration politics, and 
adds to the constructivist-rationalist debate in a dynamic way. According to Pollack,  
“individuals act according to preferences that are assumed to be fixed, transitive and 
exogenously given” and are “assumed to act so as to maximize their expected utility, subject to 
constraints” (32). For the case of the diamond industry, this posits that individuals and firms will 
act according to a ‘logic of consequentiality’ as opposed to a ‘logic of appropriateness’, with the 
former predicting that actors will choose only what is best for their utility, while the latter action 
is “guided by the aim of behaving in conformity with accepted social norms” (32). Analyzing the 
diamond industry’s actions in this way – as a logic of consequentiality versus a logic of 
appropriateness – will be helpful to whether or not the stated hypothesis will uphold. 
 Katzenstein et al., (1999) provide an additional understanding for how rationalism 
explains outcomes as a result of actors pursuing their maximum utility. While the diamond 
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industry is comprised of multiple actors – bourses, firms, individual traders – this account of 
rational choice theory would assume that diamond industry preferences are given and 
strategically exerted in the environment to enhance their economic situation. For example, “All 
rationalists use the assumption of rationality to provide the crucial link between features of the 
environment—power, interests, and institutional rules—and actor behavior” (679). Additionally, 
“rationalists interpret persuasion in the language of incentives, strategic bargaining and 
information” and importantly, “for a consistent rationalist, it would be anomalous to think of 
persuasion in terms of changing others’ deepest preferences” (682).  These interpretations of 
rationalist ideals carry implications for the diamond industry in the EU in terms of how 
regulation and consumer behavior influenced the expressed interests of firms and diamond 
traders.  
 Further, Katzenstein et al. provide a succinct understanding of constructivist-rationalist 
models, and for the purposes of empirically testing the viability of constructivism and 
rationalism in the context of diamond regulation in the EU, it will be helpful to draw upon their 
basic terminology. When making choices, rationalists are persuaded by  “incentives, strategic 
bargaining, and information,” while constructivists are persuaded by “changing preferences by 
appealing to identities, moral obligations, and norms conceived of as standards of appropriate 
behavior” (682).  
Additionally, Chong provides an astute assessment of how both norms and interests have 
a role to play in rational choice theory: 
“we are rational in the sense of trying to identify and follow our interests within our 
limitations of experience and our relatively shortsighted ability to make prognoses over the life 
course. Interests are an essential part of the explanation whether they enter through the front 
door, as a conscious element in developing norms, or through the back door, as a past investment 
in personal development that motivates individuals to sustain the institutions that they have built 
their lives around, whether or not those institutions are the product of rational action” (Chong, 4). 
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As a strong proponent of rational theory in explaining actors’ decisions in world politics, 
Andrew Moravcsik (2001) suggests, “Rationalist theories of IR or European integration do not 
deny that actors in international affairs have ideas in their heads…No one doubts or denies that 
almost any complex organization, up to and beyond a national polity, is held together by myriad 
linguistic conventions, norms, ideas, standard operating procedures, and such” (229). Moravcsik 
claims that when actors’ ideas shift it is a function of more “fundamental underlying influences 
on state behavior,” including economic interests, relative power and “the need for credible 
commitments” (229). Ideas, in Moravcsik’s view, serve as “transmission belts” for these 
fundamental interests which are central drivers of state behavior. Moravcsik also makes the 
claim that, although fundamental differences exist between constructivist and rational choice 
paradigms, rarely are social interactions strictly coercive. Moravcsik points out that “it is 
misleading to view rationalist theory as committed to a coercive view of politics” (Checkel et al, 
2001; 238). This integrated understanding of social interactions will therefore be applied to later 
analysis. 
4.3 CONSTRUCTIVISM EXPLAINED 
Much of the dialogue around the constructivist-rationalist debate stems from the rigors of 
theorists in international relations, including Finnemore and Sikking’s International Norm 
Dynamics and Political Change (1998). This work calls into question the role of international 
institutions in norm creation, diffusion and internalization, and thus provides guidance for how to 
treat the Kimberly Process as an international organization that diffuses norms from the 
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international level to the supranational, national, and sub-national level. Remaining consistent in 
this work and throughout various accounts of constructivist theory is that norms are central to 
international organizations because of the socialization process that takes place between agents 
and the structures with whom they interact. Finnemore et al. attempt to reconcile the 
constructivist-rationalist debate by arguing that this ‘fault line’ is inherently flawed when we try 
to explain policy outcomes. The authors capture the empirical fruitfulness of understanding 
policy through this integrated approach by stating that while actors are in fact rational, naturally 
calculative in terms of how best to achieve their end goals, actors will also engage in “strategic 
social construction.” They define this process as one in which “these actors are making detailed 
means-ends calculations to maximize their utilities, but the utilities they want to maximize 
involve changing the other players’ utility function in ways that reflect the normative 
commitments of the norm entrepreneurs.” These findings suggest that there is theoretical space 
to unite these two conceptions of social interactions among actors informing policy. It will be 
important to consider this notion when evaluating the socialization of the European Commission 
and the global, KP forum, for norms and rationality may be more closely related than expected 
by constructivists. 
In his chapter, Social Construction and European Integration (2001) Jeffrey Checkel 
emphasizes the particular handiness of constructivism for explaining European policy-making. 
For example, Checkel underlines that the reality of our “social world” lies at “the nexus where 
structure and agency intersect.” He continues, “The real action, theoretically and empirically, is 
where norms, discourses, language and material capabilities interact with motivation, social 
learning and preferences – be it international or European regional politics” (62). Further, 
Checkel posits that rationalists “have it easy” in that they are at liberty to ignore the interactions 
 21 
between structures and agents which in fact constitute one another’s reality. However, he makes 
it a point to note that rational choice should not be dismissed from the dialogue of strategy 
among actors. Rather, constructivism should be employed as a means to ask new questions and 
to probe the meta-theoretical implications for action in our international system so as to “broaden 
our understanding of how and under what conditions new European institutions – norms – are 
constructed through processes of non-strategic exchange” (56). Essentially, Checkel and other 
constructivists posit that social interaction among actors is what leads to a change in their 
interests and identities.  
Checkel continues to diligently explore how institutions “structure the game of politics, 
provide information, facilitate side payments or create incentives for agents to choose certain 
strategies” (52). Thus, as an institution the EU may be considered a “structure” that conditions 
the interests of “agents” interacting with an EU authority. This perspective on institutional 
socialization underlines how Checkel ultimately contextualizes constructivism in EU politics. He 
states, “Constructivism…is an argument about institutions, one which builds upon the insights of 
sociological institutionalism” and is therefore “well suited, in the conceptual sense, for 
expanding our repertoire of institutional frameworks…” (53).  Whether this interpretation can 
adequately account for KPCS implementation in the EU is a function of the extent to which the 
EU “acquires new interests and preferences.” In this sense, the case of the KPCS regulatory 
framework may induce a process by which “basic preferences are rethought.” It is therefore 
important to explore the various byproducts of mutual preference formation in the EU context, 
beginning with the seminal impact this process has on diamond stakeholders’ preferences. 
Checkel differentiates himself as a constructivist scholar by operationalizing the 
outcomes of “argumentative persuasion” – the chief characteristic of constructivist decision-
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making. In the spirit of empirical testing, Checkel sets out five criteria for when endogenous 
preference formation is evident among actors. Table 1.0 operationalizes Checkel’s method for 
testing constructivist theory: 
Table 1: Checkel's Constructivism 
1 The persuadee is in a novel and uncertain environment and thus cognitively 
motivated to analyse new information 
2 The persuadee has few prior, ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent with the 
persuader’s message. Put differently, agents with few cognitive priors who are 
novices will be more open to persuasion 
3 The persuader is an authoritative member of the in-group to which the 
persuadee belongs or wants to belong 
4 The persuader does not lecture or demand, but, instead, ‘acts out principles of 
serious deliberative argument’. 
5 The persuader-persuadee interaction occurs in less politicized and more 
insulated, in-camera settings 
(Source: Checkel et al; 2001, 222). 
While this criteria is a very useful tool for analyzing the extent to which decisions are 
infused with constructivist ideals, it is most important to establish how such criteria translates 
into tangible testing expectations for EU diamond regulation. According to Checkel’s hypotheses 
we should expect the following from the EU’s implementation of the KP when subjected to 
constructivst testing: (1) the above conditions of argumentative persuasion are met through the 
EU’s socialization with KP stakeholders (2) Policy change is intimately linked to normative 
ideas and (3) These  ideas are the primary drivers for policy outcomes.   
Additionally, Checkel proposes a resolution for the methodological challenges that come 
with the territory of constructivist theory. He relies on ‘process-tracing’, which means, 
“uncovering the setting and reconstructing the mechanisms through which social agents may 
change their preferences” (2001, 223). This methodology allows Checkel to unpack the 
differentiating features that delineate rationalists and constructivists. For Checkel, process-
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characteristic of the rationalist perspective, or argumentative, which describes “a social process 
of interaction that involves changing attitudes about cause and effect in the absence of overt 
coercion” (2001, 224). However, testing the extent to which decisions are manipulated rather 
than “argumented,” presents its share of difficulties. Moravcsik criticizes this methodology with 
the following claim: 
“If one actor is successful at persuading another in such circumstances, it is usually, in 
the rationalist view, because that effort at persuasion fits within a broader structure of incentives 
imposed by, for example, a market, a political institution or an information set” (2001, 242). 
 
Not only does Moravcsik challenge the empirical fruitfulness of Checkel’s methods, but 
he insists that changing preferences are secondary to actors’ primary interests. For Moravcsik, 
observable changes in actors’ preferences are possible because they align with wider strategic 
incentives, whether they be market-based or politically savvy. However, as noted by Checkel, 
“The point is not to make al theoretical schools happy; rather, it is to bring our models closer to 
the empirical reality we observe on a daily basis, where social actors in Europe are not only 
strategic and instrumental, but also deliberative and other-regarding” (2001, 243). Both 
Moravcsik and Checkel offer viable frameworks for understanding such political reality. The 
case of EU diamond industry regulation presents an opportunity for greater clarity on what 
separates and unites constructivist and rationalist theories. 
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5.0  KPCS IMPLEMENTATION  - CONSTRUCTED OR RATIONALIZAED? 
 
Is the implementation of diamond regulation rationalized or constructed, based on the 
established criteria? A dynamic and qualitative understanding of this question is made possible 
by analyzing cases whereby EU interests are compared with those of European diamond 
stakeholders in implementing KPCS procedures. While various types of diamond stakeholders 
operate in the EU, the most illuminating case study is that of De Beers. The De Beers Group, 
which now refers to a “family of companies,” was established by UK-native, Cecil Rhodes (the 
same man associated with the Oxford scholarship) in 1870 (Kretschmer, 1998). Since this time 
De Beers has dominated the world of diamonds, and now controls roughly 40 percent of 
diamond supply. 9  
The proliferation of De Beers was made possible by the thrifty deployment of financial 
mechanisms that provided attractive incentives for diamond dealers around the world to buy 
through its selling arm, today known as the Central Selling Organization (CSO). These 
merchants became known as “Sightholders,” and today there are approximately 68 sightholders 
in the EU.10 With this broad constituency across the Community, and with a large stake in the 
                                                
9 By 1891, De Beers controlled roughly 90 percent of worldwide diamond supply 
(http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~lcabral/teaching/debeers3.pdf)  
10 Sightholders are those diamond dealers who buy directly from the Central Selling 
Organization (CSO), De Beers’ marketing arm which then grades, distributes and sells these 
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fluid transactions of diamonds across borders, what were the EU’s motivations to regulate a 
market that brings in over 30 billion dollars per year?11 To what extent does the EU look to 
protect the interests of its diamond industry in implementing KPCS regulations? Alternatively, 
did the EU seek to “change preferences” by “appealing to identities, moral obligations, and 
norms” when implementing regulatory standards for its member states? Examining the EU’s 
historical relationship with diamond stakeholders such as De Beers will allow for increased 
clarity as to which theoretical frameworks account for how and why the EU regulated this 
lucrative trade. 
5.1 DE BEERS AND THE EU 
Since its founding in 1870, the De Beers Group used a simple strategy to gain and 
maintain market dominance for over 100 years. That is, control the supply of diamond stocks. 
When Cecil Rhodes consolidated a group of South Africa’s most profitable diamond mines in 
1987, he simultaneously took control of all diamond distribution channels through ‘the Diamond 
Syndicate’ (Kretschmer, 1998). The incentives for diamond sellers to join this alliance, or 
cartel12, stemmed from De Beers’ intimate control over two integral components of diamond 
sales: the notion that diamonds are scarce, and prices. Before the discovery of South Africa’s 
                                                                                                                                                       
rough diamonds to cutters and dealers closer to consumer sales and distribution 
(http://mises.org/econsense/ch91.asp)  
11 Roughly 7 percent of Belgium’s GDP relies on diamond transactions (http://www.certified-
gems.com/Antwerp_diamond_market.htm)   
12 “A cartel is a group of similar, independent companies which join together to fix prices, to 
limit production or to share markets or customers between them” 
(http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/overview/index_en.html)  
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rich source of diamond deposits in the township of Kimberley (the same town where the UN first 
met to discuss a certification scheme), diamonds were known to come from only India and 
Brazil. 
Although diamonds began making their way to aristocrats in Bruges, Paris and other 
affluent European centers in the 14th century, it was Vasco da Gama’s expedition to India in 
1498 that made diamonds a viable market in Europe, albeit only for the noble. However, 
diamonds were still highly scarce and even the monarchs had trouble getting the gems in their 
possession (Kretschmer, 1998). By the 19th century the value of diamonds was well established, 
reflective of their high scarcity in the world marketplace. Thus, the diamond discoveries in South 
Africa in the late 1800s were seen as a threat to the commodity’s value – more diamonds 
entering the market would drive down prices and wreck the reputation of diamonds as a scarce 
commodity. As noted in her article, The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: An Innovation 
in Global Governance and Conflict Prevention (2010), Virigina Haufler notes that “The value of 
diamonds used for jewelry is at heart based on a myth about the value of the tones, and not 
rooted in material value. The diamond cartel reinforced the perception that the diamond was a 
special gem by maintaining artificial scarcity, and “branding” diamonds as luxury products and 
status goods” (408). 
This dynamic between intrinsic value and perceived value is what makes the diamond 
market substantively different from other commodities on the market. At the time of Rhodes’ 
business venture, diamonds were purely used for luxury purposes and held no utility value. Even 
today, only 17 percent of the value of rough diamonds produced are represented by the industrial 
diamond market (Stern School of Business). The fear amongst Rhodes and his shareholders was 
that with decreased prices, consumers would no longer desire these gems, as their value were 
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intrinsically linked to their high prices.13 As long as the supply was restrained, consumers would 
desire diamonds for their extravagance as well as the symbolism they held for love, affection and 
fidelity.  
Rhodes pursued a supply-oriented strategy in order to address the assumption that “steady 
production of a good that never perishes must eventually lead to oversupply,” (and thus low 
prices) by keeping the newly produced South African diamonds from entering the market. This 
command and control strategy has permeated De Beers’ operations over time, and was further 
intensified under Sir Ernst Oppenheimer’s chairmanship, which spanned from 1926 to 1930. 
Oppenheimer continued Rhodes’ business model, committed to stemming the flow of diamonds 
into the market in order to sustain the notion of scarcity, thus keeping diamond prices high. Over 
time however, new threats emerged to De Beers’ control over distribution, as new sites were 
discovered in Australia, Siberia and Western Africa (Kretschmer, 1998). By the time Ernst 
Oppenheimer’s son, Harry, took over the organization, there was a pressing need to further 
consolidate De Beers’ distribution affiliates. This was done by formalizing (mainly European) 
distributors under the CSO (Kretschmer, 1998). The role of the CSO can be summarized as 
follows: 
“The main purpose of this organization was to stimulate and control the demand for 
diamonds of which almost 80% of the supply was under De Beers control. De Beers mined the 
rough diamonds which it in turn consolidated in a central sorting exchange in London. Other 
rough diamonds from other sources could be brought to the exchange and sold to a select few 
customers which were known as ‘sightholders’ at non-negotiable prices. These sightholders 
would then either sell on the diamonds on cut, polish and set the diamonds for sale as jewelry or 
for industrial purposes…This arrangement was successful in controlling the pricing of diamonds 
through manipulation of the supply and demand arrangement” (Stern Case Study, 2004). 
  
                                                
13 This follows Thornstein Veblen’s economic theory of “conspicuous consumption” as 
introduced in his book, The Theory of the Leisure Class (1899).  
 28 
Although now known as the Diamond Trading Company (DTC), this conglomerate has 
more or less stayed in tact until present day, as privileged sellers of De Beers’ diamonds, the 
sightholders, gather in London annually to buy from the stock of diamond parcels De Beers 
chooses to release on the market for that season. However, the early 2000s saw fundamental 
changes for De Beers’ selling strategy, as the company began to feel pressures not only from the 
U.S. (where De Beers was facing class-action lawsuits in 2001 due to price-fixing) but also from 
the EU’s competition authority. It is important to note the interaction between the EU and De 
Beers during this time period to help uncover the interests at play just as the KPCS 
implementation was first put forth by the Commission. 
One of the first of these disputes between the EU and De Beers surrounded its new 
supply-side strategy, known as “supplier of choice” (SoC). In 2000 De Beers proposed this 
strategy in order to begin formalizing its contractual agreements (which were historically done 
on a verbal, “backroom” manner) with sightholders. As a more “efficient channel of distribution” 
SoC proposed to “award fixed-term supply contracts” to “an applicant business as a Sightholder 
if it can offer that organisation an economically efficient level of supply of the categories of 
rough diamonds that company requires for the entire duration of the contract period in light of 
the DTC’s intake forecasts, the competing demands of other applicants and the DTC’s objective 
assessment of all applicants against the Sightholder Criteria” (www.debeersgroup.com, “The 
Role of the DTC”). The Commission further characterized this new strategy as agreements that 
“are designed to formalise what has so far been an informal commercial relationship between De 
Beers and its customers for the purchasing and selling of rough diamonds. The agreements set 
out the criteria according to which its Sightholders will be selected” (www.europea.eu, 
“Commission clears venture between De Beers”, 2001).  
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However, this new “criteria” resulted in various European diamond suppliers being 
dropped including Antwerp IDH, a company that had been a De Beers Sightholder for nearly 70 
years (“De Beers the Defendant”, 2004). This particular supplier raised its concerns to the 
European Commission via DG Competition, noting that this strategy will further “cut out 
industry middlemen.” Another stakeholder in the European diamond market, Arthur Beller, 
president of the Beurs von Diamanthandel (the largest bourse in Antwerp) stated that “Supplier 
of Choice is not the best policy for the Belgian trade…It has already hurt a lot of people. By 
going direct to the retailer, you are cutting out a lot of middle people” (“De Beers the 
Defendant”, 2004). Despite these claims among European diamond stakeholders, the EU ruled 
De Beers’ SoC model lawful, as noted in a press release in January, 2003. The official statement 
reads: 
“The Commission has now decided not to oppose the SoC system. But given remaining 
concerns that the SoC system could be used to artificially reduce supply, namely of high quality 
diamonds, and considering that the implementation of Supplier of Choice has not yet taken place, 
the Commission will keep a close watch on the market. The Commission will also particularly 
want to ensure that the system does not lead to a restriction in the supply of adequate quantities 
of rough diamonds to traders in order to ensure enough liquidity in the market” (europea.eu, 
“Commission clears venture between De Beers”, 2001). 
 
 This decision only came about after considerable investigation on behalf of DG 
Competition, for when the case was first opened in 2001, the Commission was committed to 
reviewing the extent to which De Beers’ new strategy truly posed a monopolistic threat. It was 
then decided that, “The Commission's statement of objections identifies a number of restrictions 
and trading conditions in the Supplier of Choice agreement which appear to violate European 
competition law, and which can therefore not benefit from exemption under Article 81(3)” 
(europa.eu). Despite these preliminary concerns, the question of the SoC system was mitigated 
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by employing an Ombudsman that would monitor relations between De Beers and DG 
Competition, working to constantly gauge the legality of De Beers’ supply chain operations. 
 The Commission addressed the SoC strategy in a press release ruling over a merger 
occurring between De Beers and French luxury goods retailer, LVMH (commonly known as 
Louis Vuitton) in 2001. Combining forces would culminate in a joint venture, Rapid Worlds 
Ltd., and would be situated in the retail sale of diamond jewelry and other luxury products. This 
merger was cleared by the Commission with a ruling in July of 2001 stating that, “The 
Commission's extensive and detailed investigation into the competitive effects of this deal has 
highlighted the extent of De Beers' dominance in the global market for the supply of rough 
diamonds. But it did not unearth a causal link between the combination of LVMH and De Beers 
at the retail level, and a possible strengthening of De Beers' position in the upstream markets.” 
The press release goes on to say, “the Commission's investigation did not establish that the 
creation of the joint venture would have led to a significant structural change on the upstream 
rough diamond market. While the joint venture may create a greater awareness of the 
Forevermark* and enhance the perceived value of diamonds channelled through the De Beers's 
fully-owned subsidiary Diamond Trading Company (DTC), this contribution will be limited by 
the fact that Rapids World is not yet operational and will have to build up its market position 
from scratch” (europa.eu, “Commission clear venture between De Beers”, 2001).  
This venture reflected another component of De Beers’ strategic makeover in the 
beginning of the decade: stimulate the demand for diamonds among consumers. Entering the 
                                                
* Forevermark is the Trade Mark of De Beers’ diamonds, and ensures that each De Beers 
diamond is “of exceptional quality” assuring that each diamond has been “responsibly sourced 
and has been nurtured in every step of its journey” (debeersgroup.com) 
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retail end of the value chain allowed De Beers to develop its most prolific marketing campaign to 
date, “A Diamond is Forever.” By reinvigorating market demand for diamonds, De Beers sought 
a new kind of control over diamond sales by way of sentimental appeal to both men and women 
alike (Stern case study, 2004). As a company that lost about half of its market share by the early 
2000s (from 80 - 90 percent of the total rough diamond supply to 40 percent today) there existed 
a great deal of incentive for De Beers to ensure consumer confidence in the value of luxury 
diamonds (Haufler, 2010).  
While De Beers was coming to grips with the weakening of its monopoly before the 
preliminary negotiations of the Kimberley Process, De Beers could not afford to lose out on 
consumer confidence in the face of such wide-sweeping EU law suits (as well as those occurring 
in the U.S.) Conflict diamonds “raised the potential consequence that consumer markets for gem 
diamonds would dry up…” as “the idea of a diamond engagement ring has taken hold so 
completely that now De Beers itself is entering this market” (Haufler, 2010).  
By 2002 De Beers felt pressure to ensure a healthy demand for diamonds while 
maintaining its consolidated “family of companies.” However, the EU’s interests in diamond 
industry operations align with maintaining a liberal economic environment for this industry. 
Based on the aforementioned rulings on behalf of the competition authority, the Commission was 
strictly concerned with anti-monopolistic policies. The question therefore remains, to what extent 
was KPCS implementation a reflection of the EU’s relationship with De Beers, the dominant 
diamond stakeholder in all of Europe? How did the implementation of the KPCS play into De 
Beers’ interests in maintaining its market footing around the world? Analyzing press releases 
submitted by the Commission (the representative at all KPCS forums) will be helpful in 
understanding the extent to which the EU made an effort to protect a profitable firm such as De 
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Beers. It will then be possible to construct a relationship between the EU’s interests towards 
industry and how those interests were conveyed (or not conveyed) through implementation. This 
will allow for a better understanding of the conceptual underpinnings of the EU’s interests in 
diamond regulation. 
5.2 METHODOLOGY FOR ANALYZING EU PRESS RELEASES 
 Over the course of 2000 – 2010, the European Commission published various press 
releases regarding the ongoing implementation of the KPCS. These included statements made by 
Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood 
at the time. These press releases best represent the EU’s interests towards the ongoing 
implementation process of diamond regulation in the EU and around the world. While the EU 
submitted policy statements in other forums such as the UN, this medium provides a more 
objective policy stance while remaining representative of the EU’s preferences towards the 
KPCS. Altogether, nine press releases were submitted by the EU from 2000 to 2010*. The 
greatest number of press releases+ was submitted in 2007, which is not surprising given that this 
was the year that the European Community chaired the KP.   
 Rather than using content analysis to code the information conveyed through these press 
releases, this analysis is deeply qualitative and examines the press releases as they were 
submitted over time, and within the context of changing political and economic environments. 
Furthermore, while personal interviews with EU decision-makers would have been the most 
                                                
* Including the year 2010 
+ Six in total 
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optimal methodology for this study, both time and resource constraints posed a barrier on 
gathering data through such methods. With that being said, further studies on this subject matter 
will benefit from interviews with those directly engaged with the EU’s KPCS implementation.14  
5.3 FINDINGS FROM EU PRESS RELEASES  
 Beginning in 2005, the Commission began issuing press releases commenting on the 
progress and developments of KP implementation. The first of these press releases was a general 
list of statements focused on the EU’s commitment to driving implementation forward, appealing 
to the leadership role of the Commission during implementation. This statement, titled, Support 
to peacebuilding: examples of EU action, was released on September 12, 2005, affirming that, 
“the EC is currently Chair of the Working Group on Monitoring of the Kimberley Process, and 
thus playing a leading role in ensuring implementation of the Scheme.”15 It is not surprising that 
this statement did not address concerns dealing with industry interests, given that this press 
released aimed to convey “the breadth of the EU’s contribution to peacebuilding, not only the 
geographical spread of EU activity but the wide range of policies and instruments deployed, 
covering support for peacekeeping operations, peace processes, peace negotiations and 
reconciliation efforts.” 
                                                
14 Including the European External Action Service, Community Authority representatives and 
relevant member-state ministry officials. 
15
 Refer to Commission website: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/05/313&format=HTML&aged
=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (12 September 2005) 
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 Following this statement was a press release in 2006, in which Commissioner Benita 
Ferrero-Waldner commented on the Commission’s upcoming chairmanship of the Certification 
Scheme. She stated, “The Kimberley process is our best weapon against a trade in diamonds 
which fuels war and bloodshed. The European Commission is looking forward to chairing the 
process in 2007, and our aim will be to make the process even more effective in stopping illicit 
trading in diamonds. We need to dry up this source of income for those who stir up lethal 
conflicts, and ensure that those who buy diamonds around the world can do so confident that 
they are not contributing to this terrible trade.”16  
 By stating the goals of the EC chairmanship as such, Ferrero-Waldner points to the 
volatility of this trade and appeals to the values and interests of diamond consumers. However, 
there remains no mention of ensuring the economic viability of diamond firms specifically. 
Rather, the statement continues to note that, “the [Kimberley] Process needs to be strengthened 
further in order to protect innocent lives and the livelihood of those who depend on the diamond 
industry in Africa and elsewhere.”  
 In December of 2006, the Commission announced its commencement as KP Chair. “The 
Commission, supported by Member States, will use its Chairmanship in 2007 to work to ensure 
effective implementation of controls by all participants and to close down remaining loopholes. 
As Chair, the Commission intends to promote the active involvement of industry in policing 
itself. The European Union’s system of industry self-regulation has a lot to offer as a model for 
others”17 In this way the Commission not only promotes industry self-regulation among 
                                                
16http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/1538&format=HTML&aged=1
&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 9 November 2006.  
17
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/1834&format=HTML&a
ged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 19 December 2006. 
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European companies, but for industry internationally. Additionally, the Commission further 
defines its role as Chair as an opportunity to lead the KP community in promoting effective 
implementation mechanisms for all participants.  
 On January 23, 2007, Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner addressed the implications of the 
then newly released film, Blood Diamond, starring Leonardo DiCaprio. During this pre-
screening speech she stated that, “Consumers today can and should ask questions about 
diamonds before they buy, ask about the supply chain and demand proof of conflict-free origin. 
We may not be able to wipe out smuggling completely, but as long as Kimberley rules are 
applied fully by every participant, consumers buying from legitimate suppliers can be confident 
that they are not fuelling violence or funding war.”18 In this way, the Commissioner sends a 
message of reassurance – that diamond purchases among ‘legitimate suppliers,’ or KP 
participants, will not fuel the intense conflict portrayed in the film. It is in this speech that she 
first comments on the economic impact of the KP trade on developing nations that were once 
most rife with diamond conflicts. According to the Commissioner: 
“Kimberley means that in these countries there is now the potential for the natural wealth of 
diamonds to contribute to peace and prosperity, rather than conflict. 2006 was the DRC’s best 
year for diamond exports since the stones were discovered 100 years ago. In Sierra Leone itself, 
legal exports have increased 100-fold since the end of the war, bringing obvious benefits for the 
estimated 10% of the population who depend on the diamond industry.” 
 
 The EU released two statements in June of its Chairmanship. One of the statements titled, 
Kimberley Process: key players meet to strengthen efforts against conflict diamonds, addressed a 
meeting hosted in Brussels from June 12 to 14. Attendees included diamond experts, industry 
                                                
18 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/34&type=HTML&aged=
0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 23 January 2007 
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representatives and civil society organizations in order to “take stock of the progress in 
implementing reform measures agreed [in 2006].”19 The follow-up press release titled, 
Kimberley Process – United to fight blood diamonds!, explicitly states the EU’s role in the KP, 
playing on both its commercial interests and interests in conflict-prevention. The press release 
notes that, “Europe has major interests in the diamond industry since it is the biggest diamond 
trading centre in the world, and more than 80% of the world’s rough diamonds pass through 
Antwerp in Belgium. We have no option but to be involved in discussions on the diamond trade” 
however, “beyond commercial interest, the EU is above all committed to the KP as a conflict 
prevention tool and a way to ensure better regulation and a fairer, more equitable world trade. 
The KP is genuinely an instrument of stability in countries where the state and its institutions are 
fragile. Sierra Leone is a striking example of this, a county that now plays an important role in 
the KP, particularly on the issue of controlling artisanal/alluvial production.”20  
 Further appealing to how the KP aligns with the EU’s development priorities “the EU 
also considers the KP as a useful tool to stabilise fragile states and support their sustainable 
development. One of the effects of the KP has been to support the integration of parallel 
economic networks into the formal economy; this can generate significant fiscal revenues for the 
countries concerned and enable them to better manage their development.” This statement is of 
note because it was the first of several press releases to assert that the EU’s priorities lie with 
using the KP as a means for conflict-prevention, rather than protecting its own commercial 
interests.   
                                                
19 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/791. 11 June 2007. 
20 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/07/236. 11 June 2007. 
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 In October 2007 the EU alluded to another challenge it faced as chair by making 
reference to the conflict that was mounting in Zimbabwe. That is, it was beginning to surface at 
this time that President Robert Mugabe was using force to secure the Marange diamond fields in 
the eastern town of Chiadzwa (timesonline.co.uk, 2008). Additionally, the Commission remained 
committed to monitoring the issue of diamonds being illegally smuggled into Ghana’s informal 
market from northern Côte d’Ivoire. The last press release of 2007 was a letter submitted by 
Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner addressing the body of the KP plenary in Brussels, and 
summarized the successes and challenges faced by the EU as Chair. Not a great deal of new 
information is conveyed in this address, as the Commissioner focused on recapping the events 
that characterized the EU’s presidency.  
Another press release does not resurface until November 2009, when KP participants 
swiftly took action to address the tensions mounting between the Mugabe regime and artisinal 
diggers that fled to the Marange diamond mines just three years prior. The European Community 
states its commitment to endorse an action plan “to address Zimbabwe's non-compliance in the 
Marange mining area” noting that, “Zimbabwe's commitment to undertake a series of ambitious 
actions to bring diamond mining in Marange in compliance with the minimum requirements and 
to subject exports of Marange diamonds to independent verification pending full compliance is a 
welcome step.” 21  
However, in June 2010 the Community voiced its disappointment with the KP to produce 
any meaningful resolution that would address the flawed mining operations continuing to occur 
in the Marange diamond fields. Omitted from the press release was the fact that the EU was 
                                                
21
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1701&format=H
TML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 12 November 2009. 
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simultaneously renewing sanctions on Zimbabwe in the form of “travel bans and asset freezes” 
targeting government officials, including Robert Mugabe (eubusiness.com). The motivations for 
pursuing such sanctions stem from both the alleged human rights abuses in government-run 
diamond fields (Marange) as well as the "the lack of progress in the implementation of the 
Global Political Agreement" (news.bbc.co.uk). As such, the EU delivered a statement regretting 
“the current impasse which undermines the Kimberley Process, the credibility of governance in 
Zimbabwe and the reputation of the legitimate international diamond industry.”22  
Nevertheless, one month later (with EU sanctions still in place) an agreement was 
reached on Zimbabwe’s diamond exports at a plenary session in St. Petersburg, authorizing 
Zimbabwe to export a “proportion of its diamonds mined in Marange, provided that it meets 
certain prior requirements, including the provision of an audit of its diamond stocks, and the 
receiving of a review mission.”23 The concluding remarks state, “The EU urges Zimbabwe and 
all KP parties to spare no effort to ensure the good faith implementation of the agreement in full, 
so that it can pave the way to a lasting solution.” Today, this solution continues to be discussed 
among the KP participants. There have been no press releases thus far in 2011 regarding this 
issue or the KPCS.  
                                                
22http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/856&format=HTML&aged=0&
language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 29 June 2010  
23http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/969&format=HTML&aged=0
&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 19 July 2010. 
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6.0  CONFLICT OF INTEREST: ZIMBABWE DIAMONDS AND THE EU 
It is important to note that although there has been an absence of Commission press 
releases since July 2010 speaking to KP implementation, the EU has remained engaged in the 
Marange diamond conflict. As stated, the EU member states continue to administer “smart 
sanctions” on members of President Robert Mugabe’s government, for it is alleged that he and 
his cabinet are directly linked to the human rights abuses of diamond minors. As of February 15, 
2011, the EU extended sanctions for an additional year against 163 individuals and 31 businesses 
in Zimbabwe, including Robert Mugabe and 200 of his “inner circle” (bbc.co.uk).24 However, 
since February 2009 the EU has devoted roughly 365 euros in aid for social programs, food 
security and ‘good governance’ measures (europeanvoice.com). This aid is delivered in the 
context of the EU’s African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) relations, and formalized through a 
Global Political Agreement (GPA) in Zimbabwe. The EU has sought to leverage the Zimbabwe 
GPA  - a government coalition formed in November 2008 between Robert Mugabe and 
opposition leaders, Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara – to “normalize relations” with 
Zimbabwe (europa.eu). Regardless of efforts towards advancing the GPA and aid offerings to 
Zimbabwe, Mugabe and his cabinet members have continuously voiced contempt for EU 
                                                
24 Sanctions against Robert Mugabe and his associates have been in place since 2002 
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12471983)  
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sanctions, which the bloc has imposed since 2002 in light of human rights abuses surrounding 
the Marange mines, the rule of law, and treatment of foreign investors (guardian.co.uk).  
The latter of this list of conditions references in part the (involuntary) handing over of the 
Marange mines in 2006 by the UK-registered mining organization, African Consolidated 
Resources (ACR). However, beginning in the 1980s mining rights were owned by a De Beers 
subsidiary, known as Kimberlite Searches Ltd. through an Exclusive Prospecting Order (EPO) 
contract. When the EPO expired in 2006, ACR took up all exploration rights. The year 2006 was 
also the year in which the massive Marange diamond deposits were discovered, and according to 
Zimbabwe Finance Minister, Tedai Biti are "the biggest find of alluvial diamonds in the history 
of mankind.” (economist.com, 2010). However, it is hard to say whether or not this claim is 
completely accurate given the speculative nature of diamond prospecting. 
It is now known that the Marange diamond mines span150,000 acres and produce 6 
million carats of diamonds per year (crisisgroup.org). Thus, soon after this finding was made 
public, 15,000 to 20,000 unlicensed artisinal miners flocked to the fields in search of diamond 
wealth. ACR also began operations at this time, but shortly thereafter these rights were revoked 
by the state-owned, Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC). In fact, just one day 
after ACR began operations Zimbabwe’s Assistant Police Commissioner, Olbert Denge “ordered 
the company to shut down and told employees of the company to leave immediately” 
(Partnership Africa Canada, 2009; 7). Amos Midzi, Zimbabwe’s Development Minister of Mines 
and Mining, commented that “The decision of the government is that the Zimbabwe Mining and 
Development Company (ZMDC) should go it alone,” adding that, “From what we’ve seen, there 
is no need for that (external investment). ZMDC has not drawn on any expertise or equipment 
 41 
from outside, which is testimony that we are able to do it on our own.” (Partnership Africa 
Canada, 2009; 7).  
As of December 2010, Zimbabwe’s Minister of Mines, Obert Mpofu, had cancelled all 
rights for ACR’s mining activity in Marange.25 The strategy of seeking public ownership was 
intrinsically linked to the government’s need to generate liquidity rapidly, as diamonds were seen 
as a reliable financial mechanism for investments. Although the government was able to 
successfully block foreign investment in mining rights, Mugabe still faced the challenge of 
controlling the diamonds being smuggled by illegal miners, which posed yet another threat the 
government’s securitization of diamond profits. In an attempt to secure these diamond revenues 
from Marange (and reduce black-market diamond sales) Mugabe ordered his current commander 
of the Air Force (and cousin) Perence Shiri to securitize the mines.26 Shortly after Shiri arrived at 
the Marange fields (on October 31, 2008), it was reported that illegal diamond diggers were shot 
dead by police. One human rights lawyer studying the case reported the following series of 
events: 
“Police drove the miners into an ambush using a helicopter, and fired tear gas and live 
ammunition. The miners were said to have escaped from the diamond fields and were hiding in 
nearby mountains” (Partnership Africa Canada, 2009; 7-8).  
 
Confirmed reports stated that human rights abuses as such in the Marange district were 
(and my still be) a frequent occurrence. One policewoman working in the Chiadzwa fields (the 
region in which Marange is located) witnessed a pile of 50 bodies after one of the helicopter 
attacks. She states, “There were a lot of bodies. They were piled up. I don’t know what happened 
                                                
25 African Consolidated Resources plc. 22 December 2010. “African Consolidated Resources plc 
(‘ACR’ or ‘the Company’) Statement re Press Reports. (21 February 2011).  
26 Since 2002, Shiri has been barred from entering the EU and his property in the United States 
has been blocked since 2003 (Partnerhsip Africa Canada, 2009; 7). 
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to them. Some of the dead are just buried secretly…miners are killed every day. The orders to 
the police are to shoot them if they find them digging but many of the police do not want to carry 
out those orders. These are ordinary people like us” (Partnership Africa Canda, 2009; 8). The 
figures to date indicate that a total of 78 people were directly killed in such attacks throughout 
2008, while at least five illegal miners died from contracting cholera.  
 By January 2009 the EU took action to tighten their existing sanctions on Zimbabwe’s 
leadership. The Council of EU foreign ministers released a statement at this time strongly 
criticizing Mugabe’s credibility and that of his government.  The statement characterizes the rule 
of law in Zimbabwe as an “ongoing failure” to deliver “the most basic economic and social 
needs of its people.” The Council stated its concern surrounding “the growing trade in illicit 
diamonds that provide financial support to the regime,” further noting: 
“In this context, it also condemns the violence inflicted by state sponsored forces on diamond 
panners and dealers at Marange/Chiadzwa. The Council supports action to investigate the 
exploitation of diamonds from the site at Marange/Chiadzwa and their significance in possible 
financial support to the regime and recent human rights abuses. It calls on the Kimberley Process 
to take action with a view to ensure Zimbabwe’s compliance with its Kimberley obligations” 
(Partnership Africa Canada, 2009; 8) 
 
On an industry-level, diamond stakeholders within the EU have also taken steps to refrain 
from Zimbabwe diamond investments. For example, two Belgian banks with diamond industry 
customers – Antwerp Diamond Bank (ADB) of Belgium and ABN Amro (the Netherlands) – 
have refused to engage in transactions that involve Zimbabwe diamonds. Pierre De Bosscher, 
Chairman of the ADB Executive Committee, stated that, "ethical standards must improve…we 
will not finance diamond transactions with Zimbabwe while it is still on the OFAC (U.S. Office 
of Foreign Asset Control) list, under an EU trade embargo as well as a number of other such 
issues…We are not willing to even finance roundabout transactions in South African rands or 
Hong Kong dollars, because this isn't good for the transparency of the industry” (allafrica.com). 
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This commitment to reputation, in combination with adherence to EU sanctions, demonstrates 
the far-reaching implications that human rights norms hold for diamond trading stakeholders, 
including financial institutions.  
European Union sanctions on Zimbabwe were most recently revisited on February 15, 
2011. Although 35 names were removed from the list, EU leaders moved to renew the sanctions 
(which include the aforementioned visa bans and asset freezes). According to one BBC article 
published on February 15, 2011, “Among those firms are defense and diamond companies, 
which the EU still believes are bankrolling Zanu-PF's campaigns to quash its opponents” 
(bbc.co.uk). The EU also suspects some of these individuals to be committing human rights 
violations in Zimbabwe. Further, EU decision-makers have noted the “weak advances in the 
country's democratic situation,” such as the disappointing implementation of the 2008 GPA. 
According to Catherine Ashton, Vice President of the European Commission and High 
Representative of the EU’s Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, "Economic and social 
developments have not been matched by equivalent progress on the political front” 
(independent.co.uk). Further, the EU’s chief representative in Zimbabwe, Emilio Rossetti, called 
for further reforms “with regard to respect for the rule of law, human rights and democracy 
which are essential to create an environment conducive for the holding of credible elections," 
adding that, "These measures are not affecting the people of Zimbabwe at large and the 
economic impact of the sanctions is negligible. They are just preventing certain people from 
traveling and having their assets frozen” (www.cbsnews.com, 2011). 
The response among Zimbabwean officials and government stakeholders has been less 
than receptive to the extension. Ceaser Zvayi, a political analyst for the state-owned Herald 
newspaper deemed the sanctions as “sabotage” of the unity government and writes that, "what 
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the EU has done is tantamount to sabotaging the inclusive government. In fact, the EU is 
preventing the full implementation of the GPA” (eubusiness.com). This is only one of many 
criticisms Zimbabwean government stakeholders have voiced concerning the EU’s sanctions 
program. 
Despite ongoing EU sanctions, the Kimberley Process chose to legalize the auctions of 
Zimbabwe’s diamonds in August 2010.27 This first public auction was permitted after a review 
mission was sent to Zimbabwe in June of 2009. The mission’s inspectors concluded that the 
country would be granted six months to fulfill its KP requirements, which included “gradually 
withdrawing the army [from the Marange sites]; ending illegal mining by setting up adequate 
security infrastructure and engaging potential investors” in addition to tightening border controls 
(crisisgroup.org). The KP inspectors28 returned to the fields for two separate visits the following 
year in both March and May, affirming that Zimbabwe diamonds could be sold in public 
auctions under KP supervision. The first of these auctions was held on August 11, 2010, selling 
900,000 carats of diamonds worth an estimated $46 million of which the Zimbabwe government 
received $30 million. Foreign buyers included India’s Surat Diamond Sourcing Limited, with 
other buyers from Russia, Lebenon, Israel and the U.S (crisisgroup.org). 
The second round of public auctions took place from September 9 to 13 of 2010. This 
time around it was estimated that 500,000 carats ($13.5 million) were sold. It is also estimated 
that between the two auctions, the total value earnings for ZMDC amounted to approximately 
                                                
27 The U.S. also continues to impose sanctions on Robert Mugabe and his cabinet, but U.S. 
merchants have been able to buy diamonds from Zimbabwe (bbc.co.uk). 
28 Abbey Chikane is the KP monitor responsible for supervising work plan compliance 
(crisisgroup.org) 
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$43.5 million (Rapaport, 2010).29 What differentiated the second auction from the first was that 
Belgian buyers reportedly sought out Zimbabwe these second round sales, sidestepping both EU 
and U.S. sanctions.30 
Today, the EU (along with the U.S.) continues to impose sanctions on Zimbabwe, 
including the state-owned ZMDC despite the KP’s recent clearance of the mines for supervised 
export. Many Zimbabwe officials have deplored EU decision-makers for extending its sanctions 
on a nation with whom it has developed a strong bilateral relationship and political ties. One of 
the most outspoken of Zimbabwe’s officials on this matter is Reserve Bank governor, Gideon 
Gono. In a speech he delivered on February 20 2011, he states the following: 
 
The issue is more fundamental than it is emotional.  When President Jacob Zuma of South Africa 
(representing Sadc) and when the AU (representing the whole of Africa) called for the lifting of 
the sanctions, they did not engage in semantics of individualism. They called for the total lifting 
of all sanctions against Zimbabweans and Zimbabwe and the latest defiance by the EU ought to 
be viewed as an affront to African authorities on African affairs, and a defiance of African 
presidents and heads of state. 
And when the views of your own African presidents, heads of state and leaders are disregarded 
or defied by another group of world leaders, who do you or are you supposed to side with as an 
African? What does that mean to the continent? 
Another reason why no self-respecting Zimbabwean who is true to his ideals and convictions 
would not celebrate is the fact revealed by the German Ambassador to Zimbabwe who was 
quoted in the media as saying that his country (Germany) wants the whole regime of sanctions 
lifted, but EU Club rules oblige them to go by the majority vote in the 27-member bloc. The bloc 
works on the principle that an attack against or disagreement with one of them is an attack on or 
disagreement with all of them as a bloc. 
With that concept in mind, it should follow that sentencing one Zimbabwean onto the sanctions 
                                                
29 This figure was derived by adding the first auction’s total earnings to the second auction’s total 
earnings.  
30 It should be noted that these actions are what prompted two Belgian banks to refuse the 
financing of all diamond transactions to and from Zimbabwe. 
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list by foreign governments must constitute the sentencing of all of us onto that list regardless of 
individual personalities or differences. If we have problems, as we indeed do have, amongst 
ourselves as Zimbabweans, or as Sadc and/or Africans, are we not capable, without inviting 
outsiders, to settle them amongst ourselves? How many Zimbabweans have been invited to go 
and settle political differences in other parts of the world outside Africa or even to referee soccer 
matches outside the continent? 
We must learn to exhaust our own African methods and structures of conflict resolution first 
before we export our differences to foreigners who only have permanent interests and not 
permanent friends, as they say! Look at what has just happened in Egypt and Tunisia. The issue 
of sanctions is far much broader than an individual such as Mrs Gono, Mrs Bonyongwe, Mrs 
Chihuri, Mrs Charamba or Mrs Sekeramayi as some simple minds would want us to believe. 
In addition to Gono, one of Zanu-PF’s (Mugabe’s party) policy makers has characterized 
the sanctions as an “unacceptable neo-colonial gesture” (bbc.co.uk). Before these last rounds of 
sanctions, President Robert Mugabe himself expressed his disdain for all EU sanction efforts 
aimed at his country. During his sister’s funeral in August, 2010, EU diplomats were present in 
addition to those from the U.S. Mugabe took this time to address the then most recent sanction 
regime (February, 2010) imposed on Zimbabwe. He stated the following: 
 "To hell with them [the EU and the U.S.]. Hell, hell, hell with them whoever told them 
they are above the people of Zimbabwe that they decide what Zimbabwe should be and by who it 
should be ruled.” Mugabe has yet to publicly remark on the EU’s renewal of sanctions, but his 
party has “embarked on an anti-sanctions campaign and has demanded that executives of British 
and American companies publicly denounce economic restrictions or risk losing control of their 
businesses” (euobserver.com, 2011).  
 
 In light of the conflicting interests between the EU and Zimbabwe, it is likely that 
tensions between the two will remain. Although the EU had the opportunity to loosen its sanction 
regime against Mugabe and the Marange fields, decision-makers firmly stood by the political and 
social conditions they had originally set out in 2002. Policy implications for the EU and 
Zimbabwe relationship vis-à-vis diamond trading are vast. Human rights, good governance and 
market values work together in a way that supercedes decision-making at the KP level. This case 
therefore highlights the complexity of EU external policies, as decision-makers factor in a 
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variety of interests and norms when calculating policy outcomes. Of course, international 
diamond regulation holds a vast array of implications for EU external policy, and therefore, 
establishing the possible theoretical explanations for implementation is vital for gaining clarity 
on the motives for diamond regulation in the EU. 
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7.0  EVALUATION OF FINDINGS: A THEORETICAL CROSSROADS 
 
As seen above, the relationship between the EU and diamond stakeholders is immensely 
complex, which makes for a complex theoretical understanding of the EU’s KP implementation. 
The original hypothesis of this study, that the implementation of diamond regulation in the EU 
will illustrate a constructivist approach to policy-making as opposed to rational choice theory, is 
only half true based on the above findings. While constructivist ideals are certainly at play, 
including the process of argumentative persuasion and normative ideas shaping policy outcomes 
(as described by Checkel) they do not capture the entire picture. That is, rationalist theory must 
also be calculated into the theoretical equation, as EU leaders seemingly embrace ‘functional 
imperatives’ when considering policy outcomes vis-à-vis De Beers, the KP institution and most 
recently, Zimbabwe bilateral relations.  
 The EU’s implementation of KP standards demonstrates a real-life example of theoretical 
convergence. In other words, both constructivist and rational choice theories should be 
considered when accounting for the implementation of diamond regulation in the EU. This is in 
contrast to a zero-sum understanding of the rationalist-constructivist paradigm, where an 
application of just one or the other theoretical framework suffices in accounting for policy 
practice. By tracing the EU’s relationship with both De Beers and the diamond-producing nation 
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of Zimbabwe, it is evident that much complexity lies behind policy practice when it comes to 
diamond regulation, both from a market and societal standpoint.  
   The tenets of constructivist theory are evident when analyzing the fundamental shift in 
the EU’s preferences towards the diamond industry from 2000-2009. From 2000-2002, before 
the KP implementation process began in the EU, EU decision-makers were concerned with the 
threat the diamond industry posed to competition in the Single Market. By 2009 the press 
releases were of a different purpose and tone – that is, they targeted the threat of the diamond 
trade in the context of the KP and human rights.  An example of this shift can be seen when 
looking at the press releases from 200-2002 (before the KP had just been signed into force). 
These statements were strictly focused on maintaining a liberal economic environment by 
ensuring that industry policies such as Supplier of Choice and mergers such as those between De 
Beers and LVMH, did not violate EU competition law. By 2009, the language around the 
diamond industry dealt instead with implementing the normative framework set out by the 
Kimberley Process, so as to ensure, for example, that Zimbabwe diamonds were not in violation 
of KP regulations.   
 Another consideration to bear in mind when for evaluation is the material cost the 
Kimberley Process imposes on KP member states. For example, the valuation statistic recorded 
on each KP certificate has seen discrepancies between exporters and importers. This in turn 
forces customs officials to conduct further inspection on diamond shipments, either returning 
parcels to the country of origin or seizing them altogether. The concern over such “valuation 
methodologies,” has been brought forth by Kimberley Process architect, Mark van Bockstael. He 
considers such delays in shipments as a result of valuation mechansisms to be a form of 
“technical barriers to trade,” thus imposing cumbersome costs on KP member governments. 
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However, despite the risk of such costs the KPCS has proven to sustain buy-in amongst 
government stakeholders in the EU, including bourses, the Community Authorities and national 
ministries that carry out implementation. Despite these and other associated costs related to 
KPCS implementation, the Commission and EU member states have sustained commitment to 
diamond regulation. This supports the ideals of constructivst decision-making insofar that actors 
are willing to forgo short-term monetary costs for long-term sustainability of human rights and 
ethical trading practices. However, without the Kimberley Process diamond industry 
stakeholders within the EU would be unable to participate in the legitamate diamond trade, 
losing out on a multi-billion dollar market altogether.  
 Referring back to Checkel’s five criteria for constructivist policy formation, it is evident 
that the EU, in entering the KP, exemplifies (1) a “persuadee in a novel and uncertain 
environment and thus cognitively motivated to analyse new information.” However, looking at 
Checkel’s second criteria, it would be remiss to dub the EU as an authority with “beliefts that are 
inconsistent with the persuader’s [the KP institution’s] message” seeing as the EU has 
throughout its history worked towards a development policy agenda that also aligns with 
upholding human rights standards around the world (Holland, 2002).  Checkel’s third criteria, 
that “the persuader is an authoritative member of the in-group to which the persuadee belongs or 
wants to belong” is certainly consistent with policy practice given the EU’s desire to join the KP 
institution in upholding diamond industry regulation internationally. Fourthly, the KP, as a 
voluntary regulatory mechanism, does not “lecture or demand, but, instead, ‘acts out of 
principles of serious deliberative argument.” This notion is further compounded by Virginia 
Haufler’s assessment of the KP’s role as a global governance system, which represents, “the 
intersection of multiple global norms with a hierarchical industry structure and strong market 
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incentives” noting that institutions as such are “particularly effective when they appeal to 
sentiment based on threats to bodily integrity, as in war and human rights abuses” (2007; 407-
408).  KP regulation therefore becomes engrained in market operations, which is made possible 
by KP member states’ implementation of regulatory mechanisms.  
 The last of Checkel’s criteria, that, “the persuader-persuadee interaction occurs in a less 
politicized and more insulated [environment]” does not seem to be upheld by the EU’s KP 
implementation. By 2009 the EU’s motives to sanction Zimbabwe diamonds are largely linked to 
the political environment that amounted in Zimbabwe, compacted by the failure of the GPA. 
However, human rights standards remain to play a large role in the sanctions regime that the EU 
continues to impose on the southern African country in light of the atrocities in the Marange 
mines.  
 One of the most provocative incidents that have occurred since the EU joined the KP is 
the EU’s defiance of the KP’s Zimbabwe clearance in 2009. This divergence of policy between 
the KP members (minus the U.S. seeing a they too continue to press sanctions on Zimbabwe) 
may in fact be the strongest example of how constructivst theory lies at the root of diamond 
regulation in the EU. That is, the EU’s willingness to adhere to human rights standards go 
beyond KP expectations, foregoing potential profit earnings from the two ‘monitored’ Marange 
auctions held. As noted, not only do EU decision makers prefer this policy to that of the KP’s, 
but businesses within Europe have shown support for continued sanctions.   
 While the EU’s commitment to the Zimbabwe sanctions regime is reflective of 
endogenous preference formation as well as argumentative persuasion (the underpinnings of 
constructivism), the rational-choice framework must not go ignored when describing the 
motivations for EU diamond regulation. Taking a step back and looking at the changes that have 
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occurred over time between the EU and international diamond stakeholders, rationalist 
imperatives certainly hold true. Arguably, one could attribute the EU’s adherence to KP 
standards as a byproduct of its interest to simply protect its own diamond market. As noted, 
diamond transactions bring a phenomenal amount of revenue to EU member states, particularly 
Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK, and therefore not participating in the KPCS would mean 
billions of dollars in earnings lost for European diamond stakeholders.  
 From an economic standpoint, norms are traditionally viewed as constraints on state 
behavior rather than as embodied imperatives (Pollack, 2006). However, when raising the 
‘bottom-line’ for diamond operations – in terms of labor safety, human security, environmental 
standards etc., - this accrues benefits not only in the form of enhanced societal well-being, but 
also from an operational standpoint. This is especially true for a company like De Beers, which 
may in fact need the KP for its long-term growth strategy. For example, as De Beers began to 
lose hold of its monopoly in the early 2000s, they saw the KP as a way to secure its grip on the 
market for diamonds. That is, when conflict arises in diamond-producing African nations, the 
diamonds that are pushed onto the world market are out of De Beers’ (or any formal market 
supplier’s) control.31 Thus, a regulation that stems the illegitimate transactions of diamonds 
means better returns for formal market operations.  
 According to Moravcsik, the occurrence of KP buy-in and subsequent Zimbabwe 
sanctions are a product of the EU’s commitment to protecting, first and foremost, the economic 
interests of its member states. Additionally, by defying the KP’s auction clearance of Marange 
diamonds, the EU seems to be adhering to its “need for credible commitments.” Although EU 
                                                
31 However, it was alleged that De Beers was buying up conflict diamonds in order to better 
control their supply (http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~hiscox/Haufler.pdf)  
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press releases indicate that the Council’s decision to continue the sanctions regime was a reaction 
to human rights abuses in the region, the decision also aligns with the EU’s political 
commitments in the area and with its international development agenda. According to Article 8 
of the Cotonou Agreement – an agreement in place since 2000 that gives the EU the authority to 
contribute aid32 to ACP countries – the EU must be committed to a stable political dialogue 
before moving forward with negotiations such as trade. The article specifically affirms: 
“The [political] objective of this dialogue shall be to exchange information, to foster mutual 
understanding, and to facilitate the establishment of agreed priorities and shared agendas, in 
particular by recognizing existing links between the different aspects of the relations between the 
Parties and the various areas of cooperation as laid down in this Agreement. The dialogue shall 
facilitate consultations and strengthen cooperation between the Parties within international fora 
as well as promote and sustain a system of effective multilateralism…The dialogue shall focus, 
inter alia, on specific political issues of mutual concern or of general significance for the 
attainment of the objectives of this Agreement, such as the arms trade, excessive military 
expenditure, drugs, and organized crime or child labour, or discrimination of ay kind, such as 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status.” (European Union, “Second Revision of the Cotonou Agreement”).  
 
 Relating this information to the role of ideas, norms and policy change, Moravcsik also 
attributes the EU’s shifting focus from strict economic concerns to those of human  rights 
surrounding the diamond trade to the ‘relative power’ of the EU. The idea that the EU exerts its 
power in the form of norm diffusion (as opposed to military power) is circumvented by Ian 
Manners (2002). When making the case that the EU’s unique historical context gives rise to a 
different brand of global power, he states, “…the EU’s normative difference comes from its 
historical context, hybrid polity and political-legal constitution…the creation of Community 
institutions and policies took place in a context where Europeans were committed to ‘pooling 
their resources to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty’” (240). According to Manners, other 
                                                
32 In the form of euros through the European Development Fund (EDF) 
(http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/overview/index_en.htm)  
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defining features that make the EU’s source of power categorically normative are the way in 
which norms are diffused. One of the mechanisms that Manners identifies, transference, 
describes the “diffusion [that] takes place when the EU exchanges goods, trade, aid or technical 
assistance with third parties through largely substantive or financial means. Such transference 
may be the result of the exportation of community norms and standards…or the ‘carrot and 
stickism’ of financial rewards and economic sanctions” (245).  
 Though at face value the ‘export’ of norms on behalf of the EU may seem to be a display 
of constructivist ideals (in that norms and ideas are seen as endogenous to policy change) 
upholding standards of human rights and good governance in the case of conflict diamonds 
aligns fittingly with the EU’s political development goals as set out by the Cotonou Agreement. 
However, from a constructivist perspective, this case demonstrates that norms and values are not 
merely constraints on EU policy, but rather, they are the source of preference change, which in 
turn “alter the underlying preferences of governments and thereby state behavior” (Moravcsik, 
2001; 227).  
 The role of ideas, norms and values is therefore multifaceted in the case of EU diamond 
regulation – the socialization of norms vis-à-vis diamond industry stakeholders and diamond-
producing third countries confirms a convergence of constructivist and rationalist ideals: norms, 
values and ideas need not act purely as constraints on the EU’s behavior in the context of the 
KPCS. Rather, standards of human rights, good governance and the rule of law act as double 
duty in that upholding these norms is in the interest of the EU and its constituents (including 
diamond businesses).33  
                                                
33 Haufler best captures this phenomenon when she writes, “in preserving the market for 
diamonds, the system also preserves the profits of the industry participants” (2010; 411).  
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 From a rationalist standpoint, the KP may also be seen as a policy instrument that 
transmits the EU’ greater development agenda, principally, Policy Coherence on Development 
(PCD). The concept of PCD has been explored as means to understand the connection between 
EU development policies and other policy sectors (Holland, 2010). The KPCS may in fact serve 
as a trading scheme that enhances the Community’s development efforts abroad “by helping 
governments to manage their natural resources effectively and by reducing incentives for 
criminality and corruption.” Furthermore, the KP, “as a regulatory instrument, can complement 
other international initiatives that promote good governance of natural resources, such as the 
Diamond for Development Initiative (DDI), the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI) and the World Bank’s Community and Small Scale Mining (CASM) initiative” (europea-
un-eu.org). While PCD has at times experienced a deficit between EU policy-makers’ rhetoric 
and actual development assistance, the KPCS can be seen as a tool that enhances the 
development commitments by way of promoting good governance. This is made possible 
through the EU’s implementation of Community Authorities, as they are obliged to install the 
necessary financial tools34 to implement KP certificate inspections.  
                                                                                                                                                       
 
34 As noted by Holland, 2010, “policy coordination and multilateralism count for little without 
adequate financial commitment” (345).  
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8.0  CONCLUSION: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THEORIES FOR EU DIAMOND 
REGULATION AND GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS 
  
 In answering the question, What theoretical model explains the implementation process 
of diamond industry regulation in the European Union? I reach the conclusion: both 
constructivism and rational-choice theories matter. Instead of treating the theories of 
constructivism and rational-choice as mutually exclusive and competing frameworks, the case of 
EU diamond regulation demonstrates that it is important to apply the teachings of both camps 
when evaluating different facets of today’s globally integrated economy. This study therefore 
brings forth two important conclusions, the first being that creating theoretical silos for 
constructivist and rationalist testing presents the danger of revealing a one-sided explanation of 
world politics. This case demonstrates that integrating both theories is extremely useful, and 
perhaps essential, for capturing the underlying motives for actor (both state and non-state) 
behavior and relations in regulating global supply chains.  
 Second, this study illuminates the significance of international diamond regulation for 
understanding the nature of the EU’s global authority. By analyzing the implementation of the 
KPCS in the EU, we see that the Community’s power as a global authority is a product of both 
rationalist and constructivist characteristics. However, future studies should employ more 
empirically-driven methods in order to gain a more accurate picture for how and why EU 
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decision-makers continue to implement the KPCS the way they do.  Empirical evidence as such 
can then be used to test the conceptions of constructivist and rationalist frameworks found in EU 
and international relations literature. 
 Additionally, it is important to bear in mind that the nature of the KP itself appeals to all 
states’ moral willingness to construct policy based on the human rights atrocities that have 
occurred within diamond-producing countries. Therefore, the generalizability of this claim is 
contingent on additional studies that probe the nature of the EU’s global authority as a normative 
actor. For example, it would be helpful for future studies to leverage the case of the diamond 
industry to test the variability of state behavior, comparing the EU’s implementation of the 
KPCS to another global authority such as the U.S. Nevertheless, the convergence of 
constructivist and rational choice models illuminates this multifaceted supply chain, forming the 
theoretical bedrock for diamond regulation in the EU.     
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APPENDIX A 
Figure 1: EU Kimberley process certificate  
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